

Achieving Jurisdictional Equivalency: Is the Army Guard a Divided Profession?

by

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United States Army War College
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**ACHIEVING JURISDICTIONAL EQUIVALENCY: IS THE ARMY GUARD A DIVIDED
PROFESSION?**

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ABSTRACT

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In January 2011, then Army Chief of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, began the Army Profession Campaign by releasing an Army White Paper that called for a dialogue concerning the state of the profession after nine years of war. General Dempsey insisted that it was, “essential that we take a hard look at ourselves to ensure we understand what we have been through over the past nine years, how we have changed, and how we must adapt to succeed in an era of persistent conflict.” What are the implications of the Army Profession campaign on the Army National Guard (ARNG) as it transforms from a strategic to an Operational Reserve? How will changes in the ARNG’s role and use affect the profession? This paper provides a construct to assess the ARNG’s role in the 21st Century focusing on the “tasks” conducted by the organization, and not the organizational structure. The paper then provides a strategy to build a professional reserve capable of performing strategic and operational roles as part of the Joint Force 2020.

ACHIEVING JURISDICTIONAL EQUIVALENCY: CAN THE ARMY GUARD BE TWO PROFESSIONS?

The artifacts and basic assumptions that define each service culture reflect their assigned roles and missions, and the principal domain in which they operate.

—GEN Martin E. Dempsey¹

In December 2010, then Army Chief of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, began the Army Profession Campaign by releasing an Army White Paper that called for a dialogue concerning the state of the profession after nine years of war.² Despite numerous accomplishments throughout the last decade of conflict, the White Paper identified areas where the Army was struggling to maintain the highest professional standards. General Dempsey insisted that it was, “essential that we take a hard look at ourselves to ensure we understand what we have been through over the past nine years, how we have changed, and how we must adapt to succeed in an era of persistent conflict.”³ The White Paper asks three questions to facilitate the assessment: “What does it mean for the Army to be a Profession of Arms?”, “What does it mean to be a professional Soldier”, and after nine years of war, “how are we as individual professionals and as a profession meeting these aspirations?”⁴

What do these questions mean to the Army National Guard (ARNG) as it transforms from a Strategic to an Operational Reserve? How will changes in the ARNG’s role and use affect the profession? Despite the rapid acceleration of change during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the ARNG’s current organizational behavior changes are part of a continuous process common to all professions. Sociologists call this process “Professionalization.” Although different theories exist as to the term’s meaning, a general definition is a “process that causes professions to

evolve as they progress through new phases of development”.⁵ In, *The Systems of Professions*, sociologist Andrew Abbot argues that traditional definitions of professionalization mistakenly focus on organizational structure, and not the type of work conducted by the profession.⁶ Abbot offers an alternative view that focuses on work, and how differentiations in work discriminate professions.⁷ According to Abbot, autonomous changes in the objective character of tasks can transform a profession.⁸ A “task” is that type of expert service provided by the professional.⁹ Overlaying Abbot’s construct onto the ARNG’s current transformation reveals at least one unintentional effect occurring due to the ARNG’s transformation, a seam that is appearing between ARNG and Active Component (AC) combat arms units. In support of the Army’s Campaign on the Profession of Arms, this paper contends that the prolonged use of ARNG combat arms units for non war-fighting roles erodes the foundation of abstract knowledge required to maintain interoperability between AC and ARNG combat arms units. An examination of the ARNG’s transformation illustrates the transition away from core war-fighting tasks to In Lieu of (ILO) missions. Examining the transformation reveals how jurisdictional change, the link between a profession and its work, is re-defining the ARNG roles within the Profession of Arms.¹⁰

This paper begins with an overview of the Army’s Campaign on Professionalism. The campaign’s intent, key definitions and terms create a construct based on sociological theories. This construct enables the dialogue to rise above traditional parochial interests by offering a new way of assessing the ARNG’s role in the 21st Century. This understanding enables the ARNG to remain capable of performing strategic and operational roles as part of Joint Force 2020.¹¹ The GWOT provides

context because the War set the conditions used to transform the ARNG from a Strategic to an Operational Reserve. Assessing the effects of the transformation on ARNG, combat arms units help minimize the paper's scope. The paper concludes by recommending a strategy to retain land warfare capabilities in the ARNG while achieving the Army Training Strategy Campaign Objective, "Transform the Operating Force".¹²

The Timing and Body of Theory Influencing the Campaign

The timing of the Army Profession Campaign coincides with the Army's requirement to reduce forces and re-balance force structure as part of the strategy for developing Joint Force 2020.¹³ In another February 2012, White Paper, General Dempsey, now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed America's military, "We must renew our commitment to the Profession of Arms. We're not a profession simply because we say we're a profession".¹⁴ In the White Paper, Dempsey acknowledges that professionalism is perishable, a statement that is consistent with Abbot's view that, "Professions can grow, split, join, adapt and die".¹⁵

While General Dempsey considers all branches and components of the American military as part of the Profession of Arms, a continuing academic debate exists concerning the definition, characteristics and attributes of a profession.¹⁶ Dr. Don Snider, a researcher at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute, has influenced the campaign through his project, *The Future of the Army Profession*.¹⁷ His book is the primary reading on professionalism issued to resident students at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Snider stresses the separation between the Army and other occupations, suggesting that, "Far more so than other occupations and organizations, professions focus on generating expert knowledge and the ability of its members to apply that

expertise to new situations and that, “the coins of the professional realm are expertise and knowledge.”¹⁸ This expertise is the justified application of lethal force and occurs within the jurisdiction of land warfare.¹⁹ James Burk, a researcher at the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute and contributor to Snider’s work contends there are three elements that define a profession: high status, which he links to legitimacy; applied abstract knowledge, the source of expertise; and a field of endeavor or jurisdiction for problem solving.²⁰ To retain autonomy and practice within their jurisdiction, professions require legitimacy conferred through public and political sanction. Burk suggests that ultimately, “expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy confer professional status upon an occupation.”²¹

Burks also explains that to call an occupation a profession, society makes a normative judgment about the work accomplished. These normative expectations play a critical role in shaping societal views towards the benefit or “goodness” of the work being performed by the military profession.²² Burk offers the following definition of a profession, “A profession is a relatively “high status” occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in a particular field of endeavor.”²³

An alternative view that is of interest to the ARNG is the opinion of Sociologist Ernest Greenwood who suggests that a professional must understand theory before he can apply his skill appropriately. The de-emphasis of skill is noteworthy because it runs counter to the majority of opinions. Greenwood contends that systematic theory is more important than the expertise or skill level of the practitioner.²⁴ He offers the following five characteristics of professions: a basis of systematic theory, authority recognized by the clientele of the professional group, community sanction and approval of this authority, a

code of ethics regulating professional conduct among clients and colleagues, and a culture sustained by formal professional associations.²⁵

Greenwood points out that some non-professional occupations such as diamond cutters actually involve a higher order of skill than many professions.²⁶ Greenwood suggest, “The skills that characterize a profession flow from and are supported by a fund of knowledge organized into an internally consistent system, called a body of theory.”²⁷ He believes that understanding theory allows a professional to rationalize actions in concrete situations. Greenwood suggests that while apprenticeship is sufficient for operational procedures, it is not sufficient for a professional. He believes formal education in an academic setting is required to master the theory underlying skill.²⁸ Finally, Greenwood points out that executing operational procedures is easier than mastering the principles that govern them.²⁹ This paper supports all of the above characterizations of a profession, and puts special emphasis on the role that abstract knowledge plays in defining a professions jurisdiction. The ability to solve problems with expert, and not routine knowledge, separates professions from non-professions.

Membership in the Profession of Arms

Is full time employment status a required characteristic for membership within the profession? How does the Army overcome the hurdle posed by the difference in employment status between RC and AC personnel? In, *The Future of the Army Profession*, Dallas Owens, a researcher at the Strategic Studies Institute, speaks of the RC. He asserts that the ARNG is a member of the Profession of Arms because it meets three of the four conditions of a profession: Jurisdiction, legitimacy, and expertise.³⁰ Career is the only condition not met by the majority of ARNG soldiers, but Owens does

not believe that the lack of full time vocational status precludes inclusion within the profession.³¹

Another writer who discounts the role that full time employment plays in defining a profession is sociologist Eliot Friedson. In, *Professional Powers*, Friedson disputes the significance of employment by pointing out that throughout the history of self-employed professions, very few can claim a consistent capacity to gain a living.³² He also points out that the need for financial support often constrains a professional's ability to be independent and free.³³ Friedson emphasizes credentials gained through higher education and autonomy, or the freedom to practice, over career. His argument is that employment has, "no intrinsic significance for appraising the powers that professions exercise, and that the critical issue lies in the characteristics of the employment position itself".³⁴

Instead of selecting one of the many existing definitions of a profession, the Army began the Campaign in December 2010 with a broad definition based on four characteristics. First, "professions produce uniquely expert work, not routine or repetitive work."³⁵ Second, "expertise is the result of years of study and practice, and expertise in warfare is a service that society cannot obtain from sources other than the Army."³⁶ Third, the Profession earns trust from "the client," in this case the American public, through the daily practice of a "self policing ethic."³⁷ Ultimately, the trust of the American people enables the Army to enjoy a high level of autonomy. The fourth component of the definition is the use of "motivational, intrinsic factors to motivate soldiers."³⁸ The initial White Paper also emphasizes that factors such as the "life-long pursuit of expert knowledge, the privilege and honor of service, camaraderie, and the

status of membership in an ancient, honorable, and revered occupation,” make the Army a calling– not a job.³⁹

While the February 2012 White Paper does not define the profession, knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors are identified as defining elements of the Profession.⁴⁰ The Army’s broad view aligns with Eliot Friedson who advocates the “phenomenological approach,” by not emphasizing *what* a profession is in the absolute sense, but rather *how* a profession can determine who is a professional and who is not.⁴¹ The lack of an “absolute” or unquestionable characterization distinguishes the Army’s method as an “activity” and “consequence” - based approach [that focuses not on what a profession is, but instead focuses on who is a professional] and how the consequences of their work affect the profession.⁴² This characterization supports the argument that all RC components are part of the profession because they participate in the application of force and share in the consequences of that application. This paper supports the White Paper’s emphasis on the four defining elements of a profession, and recommends Friedson’s emphasis on credentials gained through higher education and autonomy instead of career, as the primary way to advance the professionalism of the ARNG.

What Makes ARNG Combat Arms Units Professionals?

In order to maintain their position within the profession the twenty-eight ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) must retain jurisdictional equivalency, or a shared purpose in the land warfare domain, with their AC counterparts. Without equivalency, these BCT’s cannot act as interoperable members of the “Operational Force” — DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, recently deleted the term “Strategic Reserve”.⁴³ According to Abbot, the type of problem that requires a

professional solution determines what tasks the client needs from the profession.⁴⁴ Are all BCTs interoperable because of their similar force structure, or because of similar capabilities? For example, general practitioners and neurologists are both doctors within the medical profession, but each practices within their own jurisdiction. Warfighting and non-warfighting jurisdictions exist within the profession of arms, but their tasks are not the same. Further, Abbot explains how, “externally induced changes in tasks are more influential in determining the future of professions than the appearance or disappearance of groups performing them; tasks usually antedate groups.”⁴⁵ Abbot went so far as suggesting that, “usually, a group of professionals disappears, only when their tasks disappear.” Therefore, because jurisdiction and expertise in abstract knowledge separate professions by tasks, these characteristics become the “means” for achieving the Army Training Strategy Campaign Objective desired “end”, “Transform the Operating Force.”⁴⁶ Based on Abbot’s explanation of how professions lose the right to practice within their jurisdiction, an examination of the ARNG’s progression through the transformation phases reveals a growing seam between AC and ARNG combat arms units. Figure 1 uses this construct to explain why Snider believes a division has occurred between Army core war-fighting and non-war-fighting tasks.⁴⁷




Figure 1: Professionalization Phases

Viewing Figure 1 through a professional lens reveals that events occurring during the ARNG's transformation phases are causing ARNG combat arms units to lose jurisdictional equivalency with their AC peers. According to Abbot, "most jurisdictions are uniquely held; the tenancy of one profession generally excludes that of another."⁴⁸ Thus, the ARNG's transformation away from core warfighting tasks is dividing the profession. Abbot also suggests that, "The tasks, the professions, and the links between them change continually. To some extent, these changes arise beyond the professional world. Technology, politics, and other social forces divide tasks and regroup them."⁴⁹ Technological or organizational changes within the profession are the underlying cause of disturbances.⁵⁰ These disturbances cause divisions within jurisdictions by creating bump chains.⁵¹ A bump chain occurs when one profession forces another profession

out, or when external events eradicate a current jurisdiction.⁵² Analysis of each phase reveals a series of events that caused bump chains. These events resulted in organizational and force structure changes triggered by the 21st century threat environment.

ARNG Transformation in the Pre 9/11 Phase

The first critical event in the ARNG's recent history was the fall of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Prior to the USSR's fall, the ARNG's utilization patterns followed the Cold War-era CAPSTONE and WARTRACE programs. These programs integrated RC units into strategic plans. The programs required ARNG units only for a full mobilization, and then only for the duration of hostilities without replacement.⁵³ Few ARNG units mobilized under these models with the exception of those mobilized for the 1960 Berlin crisis, and the 1991 Desert Shield/Desert Storm missions.⁵⁴ ARNG combat units were part of a strategic reserve— "an expansion force and a repository for forces needed for major combat operations".⁵⁵ The "strategic reserve" role established the ARNG's force structure, composition, training, equipment, and readiness levels.⁵⁶

Following the demise of the USSR, the diminished threat caused an abundance of RC forces to become available. These forces assisted the Army in meeting global requirements that continued to grow despite the overall Army downsizing following Operation Desert Shield. When operations in Bosnia and Kosovo required capabilities largely resident in the RC, such as civil affairs and military police, the Army turned to the RC and found them useful for environments that required stability and reconstruction efforts.⁵⁷ Throughout this phase, ARNG Combat Arms units continued to train for offensive, defensive, and civil military operations, largely ignoring stability and support

operations. Therefore, similarity of tasks during this phase enabled ARNG combat arms units to occupy the same land warfare jurisdiction as their AC counterparts despite lower readiness and funding levels based on the Cold War model. However, RC units' success in the new domains of peacekeeping and stability operations set a new continuing precedent that would establish their utility for operations other than war.

ARNG Transformation in the Post 9/11 Phase

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the ARNG transformation accelerated due to GWOT that required the immediate mobilization of ARNG formations of all types. In 2003, the Army began a massive transformation of the entire RC.⁵⁸ According to Dallas Owens, "the transformation had many aims, but at bottom it was intended to increase the force's effectiveness for conducting future operations."⁵⁹ Deployments increased significantly following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and led to the institution of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. After several years of persistent conflict, DOD recognized growing concerns. The first question was how to preserve a RC that [had] transformed into a superbly equipped and combat experienced force? The second was how to relieve the strain on both the AC and RC due to the recurring demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom?

In order to meet GWOT operational requirements, ARNG units altered training and force structure models to carry out ILO missions. These types of external events match Abbot's underlying causes of bump chains because ILO missions require units to train and conduct tasks that are not the same as their original wartime purpose. For example, an Infantry BCT must train and conduct detainee operations, a mission normally assigned to Military Police units. ILO missions break apart units into deployment manning documents (DMD) that require unfamiliar force structure re-

organizations. These DMDs are sometimes, but not always, the same size as the previous unit. Excess personnel are then re-assigned to other units as needed, and soldiers may be placed into roles regardless of their primary Mission Oriented Specialty (MOS) if the position is coded MOS immaterial. While other missions such as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) and Homeland Defense have similar effects, this paper focuses on ILO's because of their frequent assignment to ARNG BCTs during stability operations, the most common operation in today's operating environment. These factors combine to disrupt unit cohesion by requiring cross-leveling to "fill out" the DMD. Unless global requirements diminish, these ILO missions will continue for both the AC and ARNG because they provide flexibility to DOD during an era of shrinking defense budgets and lowered force levels.

ARFORGEN is a supply-based versus demand-based model that manages ARNG units in a cyclical, five-year process.⁶⁰ However, throughout most of the decade the demand has outpaced the supply causing the process to reverse. This reversal to a demand driven system advanced the deployment schedules of AC and ARNG units alike. Units enter three pools during an ARFORGEN cycle. Immediately after returning from deployment, an ARNG unit enters the reset training pool for one year. The next two years the unit enters the Train/Ready pool. The fourth year the unit enters the Available pool and if alerted deploys.⁶¹ When an ARNG BCT receives an ILO mission, the unit spends one year training, one year conducting the mission, and one year conducting reset operations before returning to a focus on core warfighting tasks. The biggest area of concern is when a BCT receives another ILO mission during the next ARFORGEN cycle, or before reaching collective training during years two and three.

When this happens, the BCT will not train on the core warfighting mission for a minimum of six years. It is possible that the BCT could not train on core warfighting tasks for an indefinite period based on the frequency of deployments.

In addition to altering the task, purpose, and force structure of ARNG units, global demands for forces during GWOT have prevented ARNG units from completing Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. CTC's are where Army BCT's conduct primary combat arms collective training in preparation for Major Combat Operations (MCO), and are the "final exam" before deploying. ILO missions that do not require CTC rotations have caused BCT's to miss this critical training experience. This unintentional, but harmful effect is undermining the readiness of the ARNG's twenty-eight BCT's by preventing them from honing their skills at a CTC.

Similarly, AC units have done their fair share of ILO's due to the continuing GWOT stability operations. This reality caused the Army to form a new Operational Construct by adding Stability Operations to the previous model consisting of Offensive, Defensive, and Civil Military Operations.⁶² The Army Operational Construct is supposed to apply to both AC and RC units. The challenge for the ARNG is that these roles foster a perception that, "the RC, as a whole, occupies a tenuous place on the fringe of the profession."⁶³ Dallas Owens explains the link between this perception and the roles of ARNG soldiers, "RC soldiers' membership [in the profession] is likely to be in less prestigious roles, outside of core expertise, and less internally legitimate."⁶⁴ The salient issue is not prestige, although Abbot does point out that prestige impacts the long-term political and cultural legitimacy of professions. More important is the education, training, and experience that come with the practice of core expertise. These elements are

important building blocks of the ARNG's professional development. The danger for the Army is what Abbot labels, "divisions of labor." He contends that divisions occur when jurisdictions fragment. Divisions lead to increased competition for jurisdictional control between competitors.⁶⁵ A division of labor between AC and RC combat arms units would result in fewer total BCTs capable of conducting offensive and defensive operations. If a crisis requiring Major Combat Operations (MCO) occurred, the twenty-eight ARNG BCTs would arrive only after completing a rushed combined arms maneuver refresher at a CTC.

ARNG Transformation as Part of Joint Force 2020

In 2008, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, found that he was unable to expand the AC to meet operational requirements. Gates recognized the RC's vital role and utility, and sought to expand and formalize the concept of a "Total Force", with policy directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force".⁶⁶ The Total Force concept was implemented following the cessation of the draft and relied upon the increased use of RC forces as a way to ensure the success of the, "all volunteer force".⁶⁷ Directive 1200.17 represents the third bump chain radically transforming the ARNG from its legacy strategic reserve role. The Directive establishes principles for achieving a "Total Force" capable of meeting U.S. requirements at home and abroad. However, Directive 1200.17 did not establish manning, equipping or training levels nor allocate the funds required for full implementation.⁶⁸

The third bump chain, Directive 1200.17, continues to shape the ARNG's transformation. Since implementation of 1200.17 in 2008, a new global reality has set in. In 2008, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) characterized the transition to an operational reserve as "unplanned," and said that

Directive 1200.17 required further scrutiny by the public and Congress.⁶⁹ In 2011, the Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component stated,

During a decade of sustained engagement in combat operations, the Reserve Components of our Armed Forces have transformed, both practically and philosophically, from a strategic force of last resort to an operational reserve that provides full spectrum capability to the Nation.⁷⁰

The CNGR report and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review reflect the consensus of civilian policy makers and military leaders influenced by the 21st Century threat environment and the global financial crisis.⁷¹ While it makes sense that the AC retains key war-fighting competencies, a potential exists for the looming financial cuts to cause renewed parochialism between the components. This is a normal reaction according to Chris Donnelly, a researcher at the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, who suggests that, “When regular armed forces come under financial pressure, the tendency can be for the armed forces leadership to propose reductions in the reserve forces budget so as to preserve as much of the regular structure as possible.”⁷² This already appears to be happening in the Air Force, where disagreements between the Guard and Active Forces concerning force structure cuts currently generates headlines.⁷³

Besides the budget crisis, another factor shaping views about the role of the ARNG is the new strategy of “Reversibility.” During the 2012 Reserve Officers Association symposium, Undersecretary of Defense Michele Flournoy said, “Reservists” could be used as first responders and “holders of the line” for the build-up of active forces to respond to contingencies in the event the planners “get the strategy wrong”.⁷⁴ This strategy is untested. ARNG BCTs can continue to conduct ILO missions and provide mutual support to their AC counterparts, but the Nation incurs strategic risk in

assuming that all future conflicts involving MCO will match the Army's available force structure capacity.

Recommendations for the Army as a Whole: Moving Towards Joint Force 2020

The analysis of the events occurring in the three phases of the ARNG's transformation explains why ARNG combat arms units are slowly losing expertise and interoperability with their AC counterparts. Defense planners believe the future operating environment will resemble Figure 2.




Figure 2: Future Defense Planning Scenarios

Since ILO missions will continue, the Army must develop a strategy to ensure that ARNG BCT's receive adequate time and resources to train on core warfighting tasks. If not, these units become BCT's in name only, lacking the institutional skill to

operate as a collective combined arms team. With this in mind, the remainder of the paper focuses on how the ARNG can use specific recommendations within the 2011, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components*, to retain core warfighting capabilities and interoperability with AC partners while meeting current requirements.⁷⁵ The Comprehensive Review began with six objectives and upon completion made six recommendations for policy maker consideration.⁷⁶ The six objectives focused on the costs, uses, roles, standards, rebalancing initiatives, and changes to policy, doctrine and laws affecting the RC. One objective focused on the future role of the RC. The commission determined that the RC must, “remain prepared to augment and reinforce the national effort with combat and support forces in case of major combat operations”.⁷⁷

This paper makes the following recommendations in support of the Commissions objective. Despite this paper’s focus on the future role of ARNG combat arms units, these recommendations are beneficial to the Army at large. The recommendations are:

- Promote “workplace assimilation” as a cost effective way of transferring knowledge between AC and ARNG professionals.
- Establish goals for the inclusion of ARNG leaders within the Army’s Knowledge Class.

Next, this paper recommends that the Commissions finding on the use of a “continuum of service” is the way to carry out the above recommendations. The continuum of service provides greater flexibility to the lateral transfer of personnel within the services. For example, an ARNG soldier could volunteer for active duty without

resigning from the RC, or AC soldiers who wanted to serve in the ARNG could do so without resigning from their component. The continuum of service will:

- Reduce obstacles that prevent voluntary service by Guard and Reserve service members
- Enhance lateral entry opportunities to attract military recruits to priority occupational specialties
- Permit members to shift back and forth between varying levels of participation in their military service including seamless transition between the Active and Reserve Components as well as transitioning between reserve categories.⁷⁸

The continuum of service offers the Army a cost effective way of increasing professional interaction between AC and ARNG combat arms professionals. The Army as a whole is excellent at transferring explicit knowledge through the study of tactics, techniques and procedures focused on operational techniques. In contrast, when it comes to tacit knowledge, only the most senior officers receive the opportunity to study the theory of war in environments such as the Senior Service Colleges. These institutional models facilitate the transfer of knowledge between students by stimulating inter-service and intra-service dialogue. Figure 3 illustrates why knowledge transfer is beneficial.




Figure 3: Knowledge Transfer Model

Furthermore, the Army does not need to go outside the organization to find an example of a knowledge transfer program (KTP). The above model is taken from the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) KTP program. The STRATCOM program does lean towards knowledge management principles, emphasizing the storage and transfer of digital information. However, the six guiding principles provide an illustration of how an organization uses knowledge transfer to leverage human capital.⁷⁹

STRATCOM's six principles are:

- Exploit Tacit Knowledge
- Promote Knowledge Transfer as a Social and Interpersonal Activity
- Focus on Sharing Knowledge
- Connect People with Expertise
- Foster a Learning Organization Based Upon Knowledge Transfer

- Promote Trust and Mutual Understanding

Abbot suggests that workplace assimilation can break down boundaries between jurisdictions in the workspace, particularly in overworked worksites.⁸⁰ When applied to the Army as exemplified by the STRATCOM example, workplace assimilation leads to knowledge transfer between soldiers working in common workspaces. ARNG soldiers learn best when working side by side with their AC counterparts, and vice versa. Unfortunately, the reality is that a capability gap between the two groups grows over time due to differences in education, experience and training. Figure 4 graphically depicts the professional capability gap, which occurs between AC and ARNG combat arms leaders during a typical career.




Figure 4: Authors perception of Capability Gap over Time

Workplace assimilation and the knowledge transfer that accompanies it is a cost effective way to overcome this capability gap. One way to implement this recommendation is to utilize the continuum of service to enable ARNG combat arms

leaders to serve short duration tours with their AC peers. Tours could range from weeks to years based on the ability of the ARNG to release the soldiers. The obvious benefit to the Army is the use of ARNG soldiers to fill vacancies for training and missions, such as CTC rotations and deployments. In return, the ARNG receives a soldier back that has gained valuable experience. Financially, the Army gains because the soldier's retirement remains within the reserve system.

This recommendation infers more than past AC/RC integration models such as the multi-component unit (MCU) program, though there are definite similarities. The MCU concept began in 1988 by then Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, as an experiment to re-shape the Army by increasing the integration of the RC's.⁸¹ Reimer established four objectives for MCU's: 1) enhance Total Force Integration, 2) improve the resource and readiness posture of Army units, 3) optimize the unique capabilities of each component, and 4) improve documentation.⁸² However, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Resnak, a student at the Army War College, points out that, "seams remained between AC and RC units due to geographical distances, availability of resources, modernization levels of equipment, access to training areas, and general perceptions of each component by the other."⁸³ Figure 5, provides an overview of nine AC/RC integration programs.

PROGRAM	FEATURES	PURPOSE
Integrated Division	2 AC divisions headquarters with training oversight responsibility for their enhanced separate brigades.	Provide guidance and oversight to improve their brigades' training and readiness.
Teaming	Expanded in September 2000 to align all ARNG divisions with corps and team them with an AC division.	Establish or strengthen training and operational relationships of the teamed units.

Force XXI Heavy Division	1 division experiment. Expansion planned to 2 more divisions and a corps.	Reduce the size of heavy divisions and fill some positions with RC individuals.
Bosnia Task Force	Alternate AC & ARNG division headquarters with major troop units provided by component not providing the headquarters.	Provide systemic RC participation in the Bosnia stabilization force. Reduce demand on AC units.
Multicomponent Units	A single unit with one MTOE, comprised of personnel from two or more components. Over 30 now organized with gradual expansion through 2007 to 113 units.	Improve readiness and resource allocations, optimize component unique capabilities, improve documentation and enhance total integration.
Integrated Light Infantry Battalions	27 ARNG companies to "round up" 3 AC & ARNG divisions.	Expand the capabilities of selected divisions by adding a battalion.

Figure 5: Previous attempts at AC/RC Integration

This paper's second recommendation builds on the MCU concept but goes a step further. The best payoffs would result from increasing the number of ARNG combat arms leaders amongst what Friedson calls the knowledge class.⁸⁴ Friedson believes that credentialing processes divide professions into the following three classes: knowledge, administrative, and working classes. For these purposes, the knowledge class is the most significant class; they are authoritative custodians of knowledge and skill that constitute the profession's credentials.⁸⁵ This class publishes professional journals and shapes the development of future doctrine. One recommendation for growing more members of the knowledge class is for the Army to increase the number of seats available to the RC for attendance at in-residence, senior service colleges. The Reserve Officer's Association trumpeted this same recommendation in 2012.⁸⁶ An example is the 2012 U.S. Army War College (USAWC) class mix that is not reflective of the Army at large. The twenty- two ARNG and twenty- two Army Reserve students

represent just fewer than twenty percent of the total Army class of two hundred and ten students.⁸⁷ A similar benefit is attainable by increasing the number of RC faculty. To guarantee the Army's return on War College investment, ARNG officers receiving these slots could serve a joint utilization tour throughout the service. Many of these RC officers would supply great expertise and experience but would not incur a twenty-year retirement thereby offering the Army significant costs savings.

Conclusion

This paper determined that the ARNG's transformation from a Strategic to an Operational Reserve was undermining the ability of its combat arms units to maintain interoperability with their AC counterparts. The argument used sociological theories as a means to assess the ARNG's standing within the Profession of Arms and found the RC wanting. Lieutenant General Steven Hummer, the Commander of the Marine Force Reserve, recently asked the following question, "How do we maintain the operational force while maintaining strategic depth?"⁸⁸ This paper suggests how difficult that task is. It revealed the underlying causes of the ARNG's loss of expertise in the warfighting jurisdiction and provided two recommendations to increase the professional knowledge of both AC and RC professionals through workplace assimilation. The Army must not forget what Abbot said, "professions can grow, adapt and die."⁸⁹ To maintain the ARNG as a viable land warfare component these recommendations offer the Army a way to provide ARNG BCT's with increased opportunities to train on core warfighting tasks. The ARNG has a responsibility to be combat ready, but only the Army possesses the authorities necessary for allocating the means to carry out this strategy. Regardless of the current asymmetric threat environment, the Nation should not forget what General Dempsey said recently about the ability of the Pentagon to predict the next war, "we

always get it somewhat wrong a hundred percent of the time.”⁹⁰ While it may be impossible to predict, the Army can retain the flexibility and adaptability needed to respond to conventional and asymmetric threats by ensuring that the Operational Reserve retains expert knowledge and full interoperability with its AC peers as part of the Operational Force. The American people deserve nothing less.

Endnotes

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